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In little more than 100 years, Japan has moved from an 
isolated agrarian society to one of the world's most advanced 
capitalist industri~1 societies. And of equal note, Japan is the 
first nation to achieve advanced industrial status from an Asian 
rather than a western cultural base. 
From the very beginning of this process of industrialization, 
during Japan's Meiji period, many Japanese questioned Japan's 
ability, willingness, and even the desirability of "modernizing," 
especially if this meant accepting western values in the process. 
Among these people was Natsume Soseki, perhaps Japan's 
greatest novelist, who was among the first Japanese intellectuals 
sent to the west to study western ways. After two years of study 
in London (which included much reading in sociology and 
psychology), Soseki returned to Japan to question the wisdom 
of blind acceptance of western values, and in 191 I wrote an 
essay (Gendai Nihon no .Kaika, translated "Development of 
Modern Japan") which included the famous line, "Western 
civilization is 'internally evolved' progress, whereas the move­
ment of Japanese modernization is 'externally developed' 
culture" (Soseki 1965, vol II :333; lijima 1987: 144). Similar criti­
cism of imposing western values upon Japan can be found in 
some of his most famous novels, such as Wagahai Wa Neko De 
Aru (translated under the title of "[ Am A Cat"), as well as the 
novels of many famous Japanese writers who followed Soseki. 
(I) 
Since this time Japan has cultivated the reputation of 
accepting western technology while retaining "unique" Japanese 
values, or at least bending these values somewhat without losing 
Japanese traditions (Smith 1983:26). The extent of Japanese 
uniqueness can be questioned (Tominaga 1987), but many Japa­
nese are so convinced, and even proud, of the Japanese "unique­
ness" that there are hundreds of popular volumes written under 
the subject of Nihonjinron (Study of the Japanese), many 
containing what most people would call outlandish claims. 
However, many Japanese who accept (at least to some extent) 
this claim of uniqueness, criticize Japan's inefficient mix of 
modern technology and "outdated feudal social structure" 
(McCormack and Sugimoto 1988; van Wolferen 1989:431). 
Western social scientists have sometimes contributed to this 
idea of Japanese "uniqueness" with works contrasting western 
and Japanese values (see especially, Benedict 1946). More often 
than not, however, western social science has assumed that while 
Jap an· today remains unique in some ways, the process of 
industrialization will stimulate modernization, eventually render­
ing Japan's society and culture more or less similar to those in 
the western industrial nations. 
In recent years, this assumption has been brought into ques­
tion. Some western social scientists, among them the "revision­
ists," have concluded that Japan is rather unique in many ways, 
and will remain so with even further industrialization (see van 
Wolfe ren 1989:16). Other social scientists, with more favorable 
views of Japan, have also revised their modernization assump­
tions with respect to Japan. For example, in the 1950s, Ronald 
Dore (see his most recent work, Dore 1987) first viewed Japan 
as "behind" though modernizing, then later as unique, and more 
recently as certainly not "behind" but rather the model for west­
ern industrial nations trying to "catch up" to Japan (Kawamura 
1988:269). (2) 
Since Soseki's time, it seems that the controversy over 
whether Japan should, can, and will modernize has neither 
subsided nor become less confused. In the present paper we will 
consider this question of Japanese "modernization" through 
examination of a most basic institution in modern capitalist 
societies, the corporation. We will consider the degree to which 
the Japanese corporation is similar to, and different from, 
corporate structure in the United States, and the direction in 
which change in Japanes e corporate structure has been moving 
during Japan's history of industrialization. We will then 
conclude with what we think this means for the concept and 
theories of modernization. We must begin, however, with a brief 
examination of the concept of modernization. 
Modernization "Theory' 
An examination of the (slowly) growing western social 
science literature on Japan since Benedict's (1946) famous work 
suggests that most of this literature contains assumptions about 
Japan's eventual "modernization" along western patterns. It is 
assumed, for example, that Japan's family system will slowly 
change to more resemble the western family system, political 
democracy will develop along western lines, as will sex roles, 
education, and other aspects of society and culture. However, 
when we examine these works more closely we do not find any 
clearly defined theory of modernization behind these assump­
tions. We references to the general ideas of Durkheim, Tonnies, 
Marx, and especially Parsons (McCormack and Sugimoto 
1988:3), but seldom anything more specific than reference to 
Parsons idea of pattern variables. And in this respect, it is 
important to stress that these assumptions about Japan's 
modernization focus on culture and social organization, rather 
than the technical means of production. Marxian and other 
materialist oriented social scientists would, of course, be 
expected to assume aspects of "super structure" will follow 
change in the technical means of production, but even non-ma­
terialists seem to folio\>( this line of argument in the case of 
Japan. 
We noted above that Parsons' work is especially cited, or at 
least implied, in many of the works on modernization in Japan. 
In particular, Parsons' pattern variables are often used to 
describe how the value orientation of a society is supposed to 
evolve as it becomes more complex and technologically 
advanced. Five pattern variables, described as ideal-types, were 
originally suggested by Parsons (see Parsons and Shils 1951; 
Parsons 1951): affective neutrality/ affectivity, specificity/ 
diffuseness, universalism/ particularism, achievement/ ascription, 
and self/ collectivity. Following ideas related to those of Durk­
heim and Tonnies, the value orientations toward individuals in 
the society are to move from the right to the left in each of the 
value pairs as societies modernize. There has been general 
agreement that as western societies moved from feudal-agrarian 
to industrial societies, this shift has taken place. For example, 
as societies industrialize, more people in the society (especially 
outside of the family and peer group) are expected to place less 
emotion in interactions with others, focus on specific aspects of 
the other which are related to the purpose of the interaction, 
judge people with objective, universalistic criteria, assess others 
with achievement rather ascriptive based qualities, and be moti­
vated by individualistic goals rather than goals of the group or 
large organizations. 
Before we take-up our critique of the assumed value shift 
that is said will occur in Japan as industrialization proceeds, we 
must now turn to our primary subject of change in the Japanese 
corporate structure. But we can conclude this section by noting 
that the following will show that rather than following a simple 
pattern of modernization, change in Japan's corporate structure 
indicates a complex mixture of imported social organization 
and values and the continued importance of some traditional 
value orientations in the Japanese society. It seems that Nakane 
(1971) is correct that social scientists have more often assumed 
westernization when they have written of modernization in the 
case of Japan, and that modernization theory has contained an 
ethnocentric bias. 
Japanese Corporate Structure 
A formal description of the Japanese corporate structure 
today looks much like that from the west, and the United States 
in particular, upon which the Japanese corporation was 
modeled. There are stockholders, shares of stock which bring 
stock votes in th e affairs of the company, a board of directors 
elected by the stockholders, and annual stockholders meeting 
where management is to report to the stockholders. But though 
the Japanese corporate structure shares these formal character­
istics with American corporations, it does not mean that this is 
all one needs to know in understanding Japanese corporate 
behavior (as the Texas corporate raider, T. Boone Pickens, 
found to his dismay when he tried to take a controlling interest 
in a Japanese corporation in the late 1980s) (3). We will begin 
with a short examination of the historical development of Japa­
nese corporations, then turn to an analysis of current ownership 
and control patterns, and finally to an explanation of why these 
ownership and control patterns show some contrast to those in 
the United States. 
Japanese Corporate Development 
Japan remained an isolated, primarily feudal society until 
the forced opening of the country by the United States in the 
1850s (4). When Japanese political and intellectual elites recog­
nized the danger for their weak nation in the face of European 
dominance of other Asian countries, the changes these elites 
tried to bring about, and other changes associated with the 
forced opening of Japan, stimulated something of a "top down" 
revolution known as the Meiji Restoration beginning in 1868 
(Bendix 1978:482; Reischauer 1987; Reischauer and Craig 1978; 
Halliday 1975). With this Meiji Restoration the new Japanese 
government sent scholars throughout Europe and the United 
States to study all aspects of these more modern industrial soci­
eties so that Japan could learn as much as possible and as 
qui~kly as possible for their own drive toward political and 
economic development. These Japanese elites then copied specif­
ic aspects of many of these western industrial societies to estab­
lish or radically change Japan's political system, educational 
system, judicial system, military, as well as many other insti­
tutions, especially the economy. 
Economic development and capitalism were achieved in a 
rather different way in Japan during this Meiji Restoration, a 
way that in fact, can be called state-sponsored capitalism (Clark 
1979:25). The state J;egan by creating government owned and 
-controlled industries. However, as the government needetl 
money in the financial crisis of the 1880s, it sold many of the 
already established companies to wealthy merchants and other 
Japanese from· the old elites (feudal lords, known as Daimyo, 
and former samurai) at remarkably low prices (Halliday 
1975:59). This practice in time created a wealthy elite of upper 
class families, known as zaibatsu, who owned and controlled 
much of pre-War Japan's economy. Through the western 
pattern of holding companies, the top 10 zaibatsu families were 
said to control as much as 75 percent of Japan's industry, 
finance, and commerce before World War II, and owned 25 
percent of all corporate stock by 1946 (Alletzhauser 1990: 108). 
The aftermath of World War II brought the American 
Occupational reforms, many of which were focused on breaking 
up this zaibatsu, seen by General MacArthur as somewhat 
responsible for Japanese militarism. While the leading zaibatsu 
families owned about 25 percent of all corporate stock in Japan 
in 1946, they owned about 5 percent by 1950 (Alletzhauser 1990: 
119). Occupation reforms required these families to give up 
most of their stock, and other reforms further reduced their 
power by outlawing holding companies (Clark 1979: 57). In 
1949, 70 percent of all Japanese corporate stock was owned by 
individuals or families (Dore 1987: 113), but this was rapidly 
being reduced. Because few individuals had the money to buy 
the stock taken from the old zaibatsu families, much of this 
stock was bought by other corporations (Halliday 1975: 177). 
Then again, in the 1960s, when foreign investors threatened to 
buy up much Japanese corporate stock, there was a further 
increase in Japanese corporations buying the stock of other 
corpo'rations (Dore 1987: 114). And it should be stressed here 
that it was not just financial institutions in Japan buying this 
corporate stock, but industrial corporations buying stock in 
other industrial and financial corporations. 
The Ownership and Control of the Modern Corporation 
The debate over the ownership and control of the modern 
corporation goes back at least to the Berle and Means' (1932) 
thesis of managerial control of corporations in their famous 
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Before this 
time it was clear who owned and controlled most corporations­
-the wealthy capitalist families. But as the 20th century prog­
ressed, the question of ownership and control became much 
more complicated. By the time of Berle and Means' original 
book, a number of larger corporations already had such a wide 
dispersion of stock ownership among so many people that in 
the absence of family voting blocs of 10 percent or more of the 
stock, it was Berle and Means' thesis that managers of these 
corporations (with little stock ownership) controlled the corpo­
rations by default. 
The Berle and Means thesis, however, remained controver­
sial for many years (5). But beginning in the 1960s research was 
showing that most major corporations in the United States were 
not family controlled. For example, through examination of the 
stock control patterns of the 500 largest corporations in the 
United States, Lamer (1970) concluded that about 75 percent of 
these corporations were not family owned. Burch (1972), howev­
er, studied these same corporation with various techniques to 
uncover hidden stock control (stock actually controlled by weal­
thy families under different names or otherwise hidden) and 
concluded that a slight majority of these corporations were 
actually controlled by wealthy families. Somewhat later, Kotz 
(1978) added the dimension of bank control of corporations as 
a front for family control when the family was able to control 
the financial institution (mostly banks). Kotz (1978) found a 
slightly higher level of family control of corporations than did 
Burch (1972) when bank control was considered. 
Since this time, Kerbo and Della Fave (1983) have examined 
the ownership and control of major corporations using new data 
provide by the U.S. Congress under new laws that require more 
complete disclosure of stock ownership in U.S. corporations. 
These data show that a new aspect of the corporate ownership 
and control question involves the huge amounts of stock now 
controlled by financial institutions in the form of institutional 
investors (U .S. Senate 1978a, 1978b, 1980). By the late 1970s, 
almost 50 percent of all corporate stock in the United States 
was controlled by the institutional investors through their 
control of pension funds and other trusts used to invest in 
corporate stock. Using these data, Kerbo and Della Fave (1983) 
found only II percent or' the biggest 122 corporations in the 
U.S. could be listed as possibly under family control (using the 
standard criterion of a family or individual owning 10 percent 
or more of the stock in a corporation, with no other group witp. 
more than 10 percent beingable to control that corporation). 
Another indicator of the significance of individual or family 
held stock in these 122 top corporations is the number of times 
families or individuals are listed among the top 5 stock voters in 
the corporations. Only 12 percent of the 610 top 5 stock voting 
positions (i.e., 5 x 122 corporations = 610 positions) are 
accounted for by individual or family investors. 
In conclusion, these data pertaining to U.S. corporations 
suggest that when only the largest corporations are considered, 
the amount of family and individual ownership of corporate 
stock drops dramatically. However, when considering the top 
250, and certainly the top 500 corporations in the United States, 
significant amounts of family and individual control of stock 
continues to exist. 
Ownership and Control of the Japanese Corporation 
There has been much less research on the ownership and 
control of corporations in Japan (Morioka 1989: 155). This lack 
of research before World War II is likely related to the recog­
nized fact that the zaibatsu families controlled most of the larg­
est corporations, as we have indicated above. But the nature of 
corporate ownership and control in Japan has been changing 
rapidly since World War II, and we do have some research and 
d.ata indicating these changes. 
It is first important to note the extent to which the owner­
ship and control of corporate stock is in the hands of financial 
institution's, institutional investors, and other corporations in 
Japan. Current estimates are that from 70 to 75 percent of all 
corporate stock in Japan is owned and controlled by financial 
institutions or other corporations (Morioka 1989: 160; Abegglen 
and Stalk 1985). Thus, with respect to all corporate stock in 
Japan, even less is now held by private individuals and families 
than in the United States. But there are other important differ­
ences. Most of the corporate stock not controlled by individ­
uals and families in the United States, as we have seen, is 
controlled by. institutional investors through their control of 
stock herd by pension funds and trusts. In Japan, by contrast, 
very little of this corporate stock is controlled by institutional 
investors for pension funds, while 66 percent of all stock is 
directly owned and controlled by other corporations, with most 
of this owned by other industrial corporations (see Dore 1987: 
112). In other words, most corporate stock in Japan is owned 
by other corporations, and this is also to say, they own each 
other. We will consider this point below, but we must now turn 
to the stock control patterns in specific corporations, rather 
than the categories of people or corporations owning stock in 
general, as considered above. 
In one of the more recent studies of corporate ownership 
and control in Japan, Miyazaki (1982, 1985) examined the 300 
largest corporations and found 6 percent to be controlled by 
individuals or families, 49 percent to be controlled by other 
corporations, 37 percent management controlled (i.e., not 
enough stock is controlled by any particular stock holders to say 
they can control the corporation), and 2 percent to be cont­
rolled by government or Hlocal public organizationsH(see Mori­
oka 1989: 155). We will have more to say about these Hcorporate 
controlledHcorporations after we consider more recent data on 
a smaller list of the biggest corporations in Japan. 
As noted above, when we consider only the very biggest 
corporations in the United States we find even less family or 
individual control. What about Japan? To help answer this 
question we have analyzed data pertaining to the largest 100 
industrial corporations in Japan in 1988 and the largest 25 
banks (6). 
Table I: Stock Ownership Patterns in the Top 100 Japanese Indus­
tria/ Corporations 
Number one stock holder positions 
held by: percent of top positions 
banks 16% 
insurance & other 
financial firms 47% 
families/individuals 10% 
industrial corporations 19% 
foreign firms* 5% 
private trust fund 1% 
Stock holders accounting for more than 10% in a single firm 
held by: number of cases 
banks 0 
insurance & other 
financial firms 0 
families/individuals 8 
industrial corporations 13** 
foreign firms 3 
utilities 2 
Number of top 5 stock holder positions 
held by: percent/number held 
banks 34% (168) 
insurance & other 
financial firms 44% (222) 
famil ies/ind ividuals 8% (38) 
industrial corporations 9% (49) 
foreign firms 3% (13) 
utilities 1% (4) 
employee's organizations 1% (6) 
source: Japan Company Handbook (1987) 
* In one case this was a foreign individual. 
** This includes cases of between 10 percent and 45 percent of 
the stock held because if more than 45 percent of the stock was 
held by another industrial firm it was dropped and considered a 
subsidiary of that firm. 
As can be seen from Table I, banks, insurance, and other 
financial firms account for 63 percent of all of the number one 
stock holder positions in the largest industrial corporations in 
. Japan (7). Other industrial corporations account for another 19 
percent of the number one stock voter positions (8). And only 
10 percent of the number one stock voting positions are 
accounted for by families or individuals in these top 100 indus­
trial corporations. 
We next calculated how many times any family, individual, 
or other firm held more than 10 percent of the stock in any of 
these top 100 industrial corporations. As also shown in Table I, 
banks, insurance, or other financial firms have no stock owner­
ship above 10 percent, which is consistent with the law which 
prohibits more than 5 percent of ownership by banks (Abegglen 
and Stalk 1985: 189) (9). In 13 cases another industrial firm 
owns 10 percent or more of the stock (though less than 45 
percent which we excluded as being a subsidiary firm), and in 
only 8 cases did a family or individual own 10 percent or more 
of the stock in an industrial corporation. 
Finally, in Table I we present our analysis of the top 5 
stock voting positions in each of the 100 top industrial firms. In 
results similar to what we found for the top stock positions in 
each firm, 34 percent of the top 5 stock voting positions are 
held by banks, 44 percent by insurance companies or other 
financial firms, 8 percent by families or individuals, and 9 
percent by other industrial firms. Clearly, the financial firms 
dominate, with a total of 78 percent of all of the top 5 stock 
holder positions accounted for by these firms. 
Table 2: Stock Ownership Patterns in the Top 25 Japanese Banks 
Number one stock holder positions 
held by: percent of top positions held 
banks 12% 
insurance & other 
financial firms 84% 
families/ind ividuals 0% 
industrial corporations 4% 
foreign firms 0% 
Stock holders accounting for more than 10% in a bank 
held by: number of cases 
banks 0 
insurance & other 
financial firms 0 
families/individuals 0 
industrial corporations 0 
foreign firms 0 
Number of top 5 stock holder positions 
held by: percent/number held 
banks 13% (16) 
insurance & other 
financial firms 66% (82) 
families/individuals 0% 
industrial corporations 20% (25) 
foreign firms 0% 
utilities 1% (I) 
employee's organizations 1% (I) 
source: Japan Company Handbook (1987) 
Because of the importance of bank control and the bank 
control thesis in the United States, we have made a similar 
analysis of the stock ownersnip patterns in the 25 largest banks 
in Japan (10). Table 2 indicates that no family or individual 
held a number one stock holding position in a bank in Japan, 
and most of the top positions (84 percent) in these 25 banks 
were held by insurance firms or other financial institutions. In 
no case did any firm hold more than 10 percent of the stock in 
any bank, however. And in a pattern comparable to that for 
i.ndustrial corporations, most of the top five stock holder posi­
tions (79 percent) are again held by banks, insurance, and other 
financial firms. Another 20 percent of the top 5 stock holder 
positions are held by industrial corporations, and none are held 
by families or individuals. 
Thus, for Japan, the more pertinent question with respect to 
corporations and corporate stock is not who owns, but what 
owns? The above data indicate that primarily financial but also 
industrial corporations own most stock in Japan, and this is 
especially so when we consider only the very largest corpo­
rations. Some social scientists claim that the old zaibatsu was 
never completely eliminated (and there some evidence for this 
with respect to the smaller zaibatsu corporations, Alletzhauser 
1990: 119-122; Halliday 1975: 177), or has to some extent 
reemerged. However, certainly no one claims that the zaibatsu is 
anywhere close to the power of pre-World War II days. And in 
contrast to the past when much of the zaibatsu family control 
operated through their control of big banks, our data show this 
is impossible today because families or individuals do not show 
up at all in Table 2 pertaining to ownership of stock in banks. 
Thus, we must look elsewhere when trying to identify any 
pattern of corporate control of corporate stock in Japan today. 
Corporate Groups 
There are at least three types of corporate groups in present 
day Japan (II). One kind of corporate group is primarily verti­
cal in formation and related to the chain of suppliers and other 
customer corporations of the large core corporations in Japan 
today (Clark 1979: 73-74). For example, this type of group exists 
with Toyota at the top and other companies dependent upon 
Toyota's business (often referred to as kogaisha -- child compa­
nies) in weaker positions in the group, with the dominant 
company (Toyota) holding significant amounts of stock in the 
kogaisha. 
There are other corporate groupings in Japan based upon 
more equal business relations among firms in several types of 
industries. The corporations in this type of group buy each 
others stock and hold it to cement business relations rather than 
for any specific monetary gain from the stock ownership. Unlike 
the first type of group described above, it is much more difficult 
to say a particular corporation is more powerful in the group. 
These corporate groups explicitly cooperate with each other 
with respect to their common political and economic interests, 
especially through shachokai (presidents' councils). Many of the 
larger corporations within this type of corporate group also 
will be leading members of the type of vertical corporate group 
described above, thus forming overlapping circles of vertical and 
more horizontal corporate groups (12). 
Finally, with respect to the interlocking of corporations 
through stock ownership, there is a third type of group related 
to the question of bank control (Clark 1979: 75-76). At the 
center of many corporate groups are often big banks, and our 
tables presented above certainly indicated that big banks tend to 
hold more stock in other corporations than do industrial corpo­
rations. There is agreement that big banks used to dominate the 
zaibatsu groups before World War II, but there is less agree­
ment on the power of banks in Japan today. Among the 
evidence for bank dominance is the extensive stock ownership of 
banks, interlocking directorates from banks to industrial corpo­
rations (in the face of very few other outside directors overall in 
Japan, and especially so from other corporations), and the 
historically high dependence on banks by industrial corporations 
for capital (in contrast to raising capital through stock issues) 
(Abegglen and Stalk 1985:185; van Wolferen 1989:121; Morioka 
1989: 149). However, others, especially Clark (1979:77-78), argue 
that bank power has been overrated in Japan. In his view, banks 
are no longer so powerful because I) there is a relatively high 
number of banks in the economy making for extensive competi­
tion and 2) other corporations are no longer very dependent 
upon commercial banks for capital because of internal sources 
of capital since the 1960s. And, as noted above, banks can no 
longer own over 5 percent of the stock of another corporation 
(Abegglen and Stalk 1985: 189). A full examination of the bank 
control thesis in Japan is beyond the scope of this paper, but it 
seems safe to say that, though banks may be powerful in Japan, 
they are not the only forces behind the patterns of corporate 
groups found in Japan today. Suggested reasons for the corpo­
rate group formations in Japan is our next subject. 
Japanese Traditions and Corporate Characteristics 
Thus far, we have seen that Japan consciously copied many 
of the primary characteristics of western corporate structure, 
beginning in the Meiji period, and especially so during the 
Occupation reforms after World War II. But we have also seen 
that though many characteristics of Japanese corporate structure 
are similar to those found in the west, there are significant 
differences. Two important differences pertain to the extensive 
amount of stock ownership by corporations themselves and the 
manner in which groups are formed among these corporations. 
It might be argued that corporations buy extensive amounts 
of stock in other corporations for the same reasons any individ­
ual or wealthy family would do so -- for economic return and 
to control corporations. With the case of extensive Japanese 
corporate ownership of corporate stock, these reasons, however, 
do not seem plausible. First, corporations in Japan pay only 
very small stock dividends, of about I to 2 percent of the face 
value of the stock, with no relation to yearly corporate profits 
(Abegglen and Stalk 1985: 184). Secondly, if stock is bought and 
sold by other corporations mainly for its appreciation, this stock 
would be traded more often, rather than held many, many 
years, irrespective of stock market conditions. Thirdly, if 
economic gain were the primary motivating factor, corporate 
financial resources would more likely go into expanding indus­
trial capacity and market share, or at least be put into real 
estate which is where the big profits are being made. Fourthly, 
if stock ownership in other corporations was primarily to 
achieve control of other corporations, we would expect extensive 
interlocking directorates in Japan, with stock control used to 
gain a position on the corporate board. But such is not the 
case. In a major contrast to the United States, of an average of 
30 board members in the average corporation in Japan, only 2 
or 3 are usually outside directors, compared to about half in the 
United States (Clark 1979: 100; Abegglen and Stalk 1985: 185). 
One typical explanation for why Japanese corporations buy 
each others' stock is related to the need for personal ties or 
personal relations between business partners (Clark 1979: 86; 
van Wolferen 1989: 110; AllIetzhauser 1990: 34). Buying an 
extensive am ount of a business partner's stock signifies the 
importance of the relations and the goodwill of the partner. 
Even if the attention and expense devoted to personal relations 
do not seem to make economic sense, especially to an outsider, 
the personal relations are maintained. A simple cold, calculated, 
impersonal business relationship, as is more the norm in the 
west, is less accepted in Japan. A long term relationship, and a 
business relationship based upon trust and predictability is more 
important. This is said to be how business relations were 
conducted in Japan before the Meiji Restoration, during the 
dominance of the zaibatsu, as well as in the present (Alletzhau­
ser 1990: 34). 
It is at this point that we can return briefly to our discus­
sion of modernization and Parsons' concept of pattern variables. 
Though they are unlikely aware of the fact, the arguments used 
by western and Japanese social scientists as to why personal ties 
and mutual stock holding are important in the business world 
in Japan seem to be taken directly from Parsons, but in a direc­
tion the opposite of what Parsons and modernization theory 
would predict. Compared to the west, the affectivity rather than 
the affective-neutrality side of the pattern variable seems rela­
tively more important in the Japanese economy, as is diffuseness 
rather than specificity, and particularism rather than universal-' 
ism when relating to individuals, even in business relations. In 
Parsons' terms, a rather "unmodern" thing to do (13). 
The greater importance of the group in Japan is often 
commented upon, and of course, is related to one of the pattern 
variables (self vs. collective) given less emphasis by Parsons in 
later works. The relatively greater Japanese tradition of focus­
ing upon group needs more than individual needs and desires 
has many possible effects on the economy, such as a greater 
commitment to the work group, and hard work even without 
extensive personal monetary gain when individuals are moti­
vated to work hard due to group pressure and commitment to 
group members (Japanese managers, for example, are the lowest 
paid among the advanced industrial nations and the overall 
level of income inequality is also the lowest among industrial 
nations, Kerbo 1991: chapter 13). 
With respect to corporate structure, the importance of the 
in-group vs the out-group which is created by a higher level of 
group loyalty can help us explain why stock ownership does not 
bring significant stockholder rights in Japan (for a discussion of 
this lack of rights, see Abegglen and Stalk 1985: 175; Clark 
1979: 100). This is also why Dore (1987: 12) describes Japan's 
economy as managerial production vs. shareholder-dominated 
capitalism. The mere purchase of stock in a corporation does 
not necessarily bring group membership. Stock holders, especial­
ly those holding small amounts of stock, holding the stock for 
the short term, and considered to be holding stock for personal 
economic gain, are not among the in-group (14). More than in 
the west, the corporation is seen as belonging to the empIoyees 
(workers and managers) rather than outside stock holders. 
However, we can, of course, move to a higher level of group 
and use this same in-group vs. out-group analysis to understand 
the corporate group formations. While the level of identifica­
tion (or sense of in-group) with a corporate gurupu or keiretsu 
would be much lower, we can still understand the tendency to 
form these higher level groups in this aspect of Japanese society 
and culture. 
We can conclude this section by noting that all differences 
in Japanese corporate structure can not be explained by culture, 
tradition, and "uniqueH social organization. For example, many 
of the rather unique characteristics of the Japanese economy 
can be understood with reference to Japan's late development as 
an industrial nation (Clark 1979; Halliday 1975). However, our 
main argument is that at least some important characteristics of 
Japanese corporate structure can be understood as a result of 
Japanese traditions and values that differ from most western 
industrial nations. 
Modernization Theory Reconsidered 
As noted in beginning this essay, modernization theory is 
steeped in the traditions of Durkheim, Weber, Tonnies, and 
Spencer, or at least how these classic theorists were interpreted 
by Pa'rsons (Parsons 1937, 1951; see Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope 
1975). With respect to comparative analysis, however, Max 
Weber and Emile Durkheim took fundamentally different 
approaches. Weber was much more likely to reject single causa­
tion in comparative and historical analysis in favor of a view 
which recognized a combination of causes (Smelser 1976: 145; 
Ragin and Zaret 1983: 740). In addition, Weber held out the 
possibility that similar affects could have differing combinations. 
of causes (Smelser 1976:. 142), requiring more detailed historical 
analysis of specific societies. Durkheim, on the other hand, 
looked for more single causation and general laws that could be 
applied cross-culturally to explain the same social outcomes in 
differing societies. Durkheim's style of comparative-historical 
sociology has been more popular, in part because it promises to 
reveal natural laws and accumulative knowledge like the phys­
ical sciences (Ragin and Zaret 1983: 749). It unfortunately 
seems that modernization theory has been more informed by 
Durkheim's style than that of Weber. Even among western 
industrial societies, the Durkheimian perspective in sociology 
has led us to neglect the variety of social arrangements and 
means of reaching industrialization (Giddens 1973). This may 
prove to be even more the case as we learn more about Japan, 
the first industrial society with a non-western cultural base. 
Another problem which is credited to functional evolution­
ary theories, such as Parsons' view of modernization, is the 
assumption of a steady line of progress that all societies would 
follow in the social evolutionary process of modernization 
(Lenski 1976). This does not mean that any kind of evolution­
ary theory must be rejected, but it does mean that any evolu­
tionary theory such as modernization theory must recognize 
greater complexity in the evolutionary path and in the mix of 
variables that lead to modernization. In other words, a modern­
ization perspective giving greater recognition of Weber is needed 
if we are able to understand the variety of national experiences 
with modernization, and the causes and outcomes. 
In this essay we have examined the history of Japan's corpo­
rate structure and how the west has been a model for Japan's 
development in many ways. However, we have also showed that 
differing historical forces and cultural traditions have made 
Japan's 'process of modernization somewhat different. And rath­
er than following a steady line of modernization to catch-up 
with the west, as has often been implied in discussions of 
Japan's modernization, it can be said that Japanese traditions 
and particular historical circumstances have resulted in Japanese 
socioeconomic arrangements that now are being copied, to the 
extent possible, by the western industrial nations once thought 
to be leading the way for Japan. 
The case of Japan seems to indicate that people such as 
Smith (1983) and Nakane (1971) are correct in suggesting that 
modernization has often incorrectly .been assumed to mean the 
same thing as westernization. Thus, there was a cultural bias, 
an ethnocentrism, in modernization theory which implicitly 
assumed that western values (e.g., Parsons' pattern variables) 
could only fit well with a modern industrial technology. Which 
brings us back to Natsume Soseki, who worried in the early 
1900s that western values would not always fit well with Japa­
nese traditions, and that these values would be imposed upon 
Japan. Japan is certainly changing in many, many ways as the 
country becomes a more mature industrial society, but they are 
not necessarily changes imposed by the western model of 
modernization. 
(I) For example, Junichiro Tanizaki presents a very ambiguous 
view the young westernizing Japanese in his novels such as 
ChUin no Ai (translated under the title of "Naomi"). And of 
course there is the famous Yukio Mishima who wrote many 
post-World War II novels with themes pertaining to the corro­
sive affects of western materialistic values on Japan (such as in 
his tetralogy translated under the title The Sea of Fertility. These 
early novels by Japanese writers such as Soseki deserve more 
attention by western social scientists for the understanding 
about Japanese society and culture they can provide. And this is 
especially so in the case of Soseki who perhaps best understood 
the west from his stay in London and study of western social 
sCIence. 
(2) In this regard it is interesting to note that many of the 
Soviet elite seem to accept this view, and have concluded that 
Japan is the most likely model for Soviet modernization. In 
1990 the Soviet government began a process of sending scholars 
to Japan and inviting Japanese scholars to the Soviet Union so 
that they can perhaps copy the Japanese process of moderniza­
tion and industrialization (see the Los Angeles Times, February 
24, 1991). 
(3) For a summary of these events, see the Businnes Tokyo arti­
cle by Fuchs and Russen (1991). In brief, Pickens tried to gain 
control of the Koito Manufacturing Co., part of the Toyota 
Motor Co. keiretsu without much knowledge on his part of how 
the Japanese corporate structure really operates, creating a 
complex international business conflict. and personal disaster 
for his own business interests. 
(4) It should be noted, however, that some scholars argue that 
Japan did have some internal economic development and 
"modernization" occurring during the Tokugawa period, which 
is another reason that Japan's feudalism was more similar to 
that of Europe than any other Asian nation (Arnason 1988). 
(5) It should be noted that the Berle and Means' thesis contin­
ues to be controversial in many respects. While, as discussed 
below, it is now clear that few of the biggest corporations are 
owned and controlled by wealthy capitalist families, there is still 
considerable question about whether these corporations are 
controlled by independent managers of each corporation (see 
Kerbo and Della Fave 1983). 
(6) Our data on the top industrial corporations and banks as 
measured by total income comes from a list of the top 1500 
corporations in Japan during 1988 published by The Japan 
Times publishing company (The Japan Times, 1988). Our data 
on the top stock holders in these companies for 1987 comes 
from the Japan Company Handbook published by Toyo Keisai 
Shinposha (1987). Among other relevant corporate data, this 
two volume book lists the top 5 to 10 stock holders in each of 
these corporations. We began with a list of the top 124 indus­
trial corporations, but reduced the list to the top 100 listed in 
the Japan Company Handbook. Of the top 124 on our first list, 
18 were not included due to government or foreign ownership. 
Then, another 6 were exluded as being subsidiaries of larger 
firms (with 45 percent or more of the stock held by a parent 
firm). Of the top 25 banks in. our data from the Japan Company 
Handbook, we excluded three which are government owned 
(such as The Bank of Japan), and thus our 25th largest is actu­
ally the 28 largest of alia Japan banks in terms of income for 
1988. 
(7) In all cases in Table I and 2 that lists insurance and other 
financial firms, the most numerous cases are insurance compa­
nies. The other financial firms include a few trust banks and 
real estate investment firms. 
(8) It should be noted that we excluded subsidiaries of other 
industrial firms from the data, which we defined as a industriao 
firm with more than 45 percent of it's stock held by another 
corporation. 
(9) However, we did find a small number of cases in which 
from 5 to 5.8 percent of the stock was held by a bank or insur­
ance company, which suggests that the law is not too closely 
watched or has been defined to mean that within the 5 percent 
range is acceptable. 
(10) Our data exclude government owned banks, which means 
that the largest bank in Japan, in terms of income in 1988, The 
Bank of Japan, was excluded. 
(II) There in some confusion over what these three types of 
groups are called. Clark (1979) uses the term "zaibatsu" to 
describe all three types, though he recognizes they do not corre­
spond to the pre-World War II zaibatsu. Van WQlferen (1898: 
46), however, refers to the groupings of corporations with more 
equal status as corporate gurupu and the more verticalli linked 
corporations formed around dominate corporations and their 
suppliers as keiretsu. Abegglen and Stalk (1985: 162), on the 
other hand, refer to the bank centered groups as keiretsu, and 
only refer to the other as corporate groups. We have seen busi­
ness publications using the terms in different ways as well. 
Thus, we will simply refer to these as different types of corpo­
rate groups. 
(12) Keiretsu and corporate gurupus are not always easy to 
distinguish because vertical vs horizontal arraignments are rela­
tive in nature. Most often, however, a keiretsu group is clearly 
distinguished by the core company and subcontractor relation­
ship in a specific industry, such as auto production, whereas 
member of a corporate gurupu will be in several types of indus­
try. 
(13) This value on long term human relations in business 
relationships, where loyalty and commitment are more impor­
tant than short term economic gain, is at the heart of much of 
the trade friction between the United States and Japan. During 
1990 the Japanese and American Governments held talks 
referred to as the "Structural Impediments Initiative Conference" 
which in large part focused on the distribution system in Japan 
which is based upon these long term business ties between 
producers and distributors. These business relations in Japan 
do not fit with the universalistic, specificity, and affective 
neutrality pattern variables describe by Parsons and, of course, 
conflict with western norms and traditions in doing business 
today. Thus, American firms are kept out of this distribution 
network in Japan, in contrast to another western nation where 
they would more easily be let into the network if it made 
economic sense to the distributors. 
(14) This stress upon the in-group and loyalty to one boss is 
said to be the reason there are very few hostile take-overs in 
Japan, and in fact very few corporate mergers period (Abegglen 
and Stalk 1985:202; Clark 1979: 86). And certainly "green mail" 
is considered very negatively: "In Japan, those who buy big 
blocks of shares and try to run up stock prices are thought of a 
corrupt and collusive, akin to gangsterism" (Alletzhauser 1990: 
292). As noted earlier, this is something that T. Boone Pick ins 
learned too late. 
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